Repository navigation
Expand file tree
/
Copy pathoauth2.go
More file actions
596 lines (547 loc) · 22.9 KB
/
Copy pathoauth2.go
File metadata and controls
596 lines (547 loc) · 22.9 KB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
package httpmw
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"golang.org/x/oauth2"
"cdr.dev/slog/v3"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/database"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpapi"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpmw/loggermw"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/promoauth"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/cryptorand"
)
type oauth2StateKey struct{}
type OAuth2State struct {
Token *oauth2.Token
Redirect string
StateString string
}
// OAuth2 returns the state from an oauth request.
func OAuth2(r *http.Request) OAuth2State {
oauth, ok := r.Context().Value(oauth2StateKey{}).(OAuth2State)
if !ok {
panic("developer error: oauth middleware not provided")
}
return oauth
}
// ExtractOAuth2 is a middleware for automatically redirecting to OAuth
// URLs, and handling the exchange inbound. Any route that does not have
// a "code" URL parameter will be redirected.
// AuthURLOpts are passed to the AuthCodeURL function. If this is nil,
// the default option oauth2.AccessTypeOffline will be used.
//
// pkceMethods should be a list like ['S256', 'plain'] indicating
// which PKCE methods are supported by the OAuth2 provider. If empty,
// PKCE will not be used.
//
// redirectAllowedHosts, when non-empty, enables dynamic redirect_uri
// construction from the request Host header. The request Host must match
// (case-insensitive, ignoring port) one of the listed hostnames. The
// dynamic redirect_uri is cached in a cookie so the same value is reused
// for the token exchange, as required by RFC 6749 section 4.1.3. Pass nil
// to preserve the legacy behavior of using the redirect_uri baked into
// config at startup.
//
// redirectDefaultScheme is the scheme used when constructing the dynamic
// redirect_uri. It is populated from the configured AccessURL and takes
// precedence over r.TLS / X-Forwarded-Proto because some reverse proxies
// report the inner-hop scheme (e.g. "http") rather than the original
// client-facing scheme, which would produce a redirect_uri the IdP
// rejects. Callers must always supply this when redirectAllowedHosts is
// non-empty; an empty value would yield an invalid redirect_uri without
// a scheme.
func ExtractOAuth2(config promoauth.OAuth2Config, client *http.Client, cookieCfg codersdk.HTTPCookieConfig, authURLOpts map[string]string, pkceMethods []promoauth.Oauth2PKCEChallengeMethod, redirectAllowedHosts []string, redirectDefaultScheme string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
opts := make([]oauth2.AuthCodeOption, 0, len(authURLOpts)+1)
opts = append(opts, oauth2.AccessTypeOffline)
for k, v := range authURLOpts {
opts = append(opts, oauth2.SetAuthURLParam(k, v))
}
// Pre-normalize the allowlist once so the per-request check is a plain
// case-insensitive compare and we do not re-allocate on every login.
normalizedAllowedHosts := make([]string, 0, len(redirectAllowedHosts))
for _, h := range redirectAllowedHosts {
h = strings.TrimSpace(h)
if h == "" {
continue
}
normalizedAllowedHosts = append(normalizedAllowedHosts, strings.ToLower(h))
}
dynamicRedirectEnabled := len(normalizedAllowedHosts) > 0
// Only S256 PKCE is currently supported.
sha256PKCESupported := slices.Contains(pkceMethods, promoauth.PKCEChallengeMethodSha256)
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
if client != nil {
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2.HTTPClient, client)
}
// Interfaces can hold a nil value
if config == nil || reflect.ValueOf(config).IsNil() {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "The oauth2 method requested is not configured!",
})
return
}
// OIDC errors can be returned as query parameters. This can happen
// if for example we are providing and invalid scope.
// We should terminate the OIDC process if we encounter an error.
errorMsg := r.URL.Query().Get("error")
errorDescription := r.URL.Query().Get("error_description")
errorURI := r.URL.Query().Get("error_uri")
if errorMsg != "" {
// Combine the errors into a single string if either is provided.
if errorDescription == "" && errorURI != "" {
errorDescription = fmt.Sprintf("error_uri: %s", errorURI)
} else if errorDescription != "" && errorURI != "" {
errorDescription = fmt.Sprintf("%s, error_uri: %s", errorDescription, errorURI)
}
errorMsg = fmt.Sprintf("Encountered error in oidc process: %s", errorMsg)
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: errorMsg,
// This message might be blank. This is ok.
Detail: errorDescription,
})
return
}
code := r.URL.Query().Get("code")
state := r.URL.Query().Get("state")
redirect := r.URL.Query().Get("redirect")
if redirect != "" {
// We want to ensure that we're only ever redirecting to the application.
// We could be more strict here and check to see if the host matches
// the host of the AccessURL but ultimately as long as our redirect
// url omits a host we're ensuring that we're routing to a path
// local to the application.
redirect = httpapi.SafeRedirectPath(redirect)
}
// When dynamic redirect URIs are enabled, validate the request Host
// against the allowlist regardless of whether we are initiating the
// flow or handling the callback. Doing this upfront avoids burning
// state and lets us reject obviously-bad requests with a clear error.
var dynamicRedirectURI string
if dynamicRedirectEnabled {
hostname := r.Host
if h, _, splitErr := net.SplitHostPort(r.Host); splitErr == nil {
hostname = h
}
if !slices.Contains(normalizedAllowedHosts, strings.ToLower(hostname)) {
if rlogger := loggermw.RequestLoggerFromContext(ctx); rlogger != nil {
rlogger.WithFields(
slog.F("oidc_rejected_reason", "host_not_in_allowlist"),
slog.F("oidc_rejected_host", hostname),
)
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "OIDC login is not permitted from this host.",
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("Host %q is not in the OIDC redirect allowlist. Configure CODER_OIDC_REDIRECT_ALLOWED_HOSTS to include it.", hostname),
})
return
}
dynamicRedirectURI = buildDynamicRedirectURI(r, redirectDefaultScheme)
}
if code == "" {
// If the code isn't provided, we'll redirect!
var state string
// If this url param is provided, then a user is trying to merge
// their account with an OIDC account. Their password would have
// been required to get to this point, so we do not need to verify
// their password again.
oidcMergeState := r.URL.Query().Get("oidc_merge_state")
if oidcMergeState != "" {
state = oidcMergeState
} else {
var err error
state, err = cryptorand.String(32)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Internal error generating state string.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
}
http.SetCookie(rw, cookieCfg.Apply(&http.Cookie{
Name: codersdk.OAuth2StateCookie,
Value: state,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
}))
// Redirect must always be specified, otherwise
// an old redirect could apply!
http.SetCookie(rw, cookieCfg.Apply(&http.Cookie{
Name: codersdk.OAuth2RedirectCookie,
Value: redirect,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
}))
authOpts := slices.Clone(opts)
if sha256PKCESupported {
verifier := oauth2.GenerateVerifier()
authOpts = append(authOpts, oauth2.S256ChallengeOption(verifier))
http.SetCookie(rw, cookieCfg.Apply(&http.Cookie{
Name: codersdk.OAuth2PKCEVerifier,
Value: verifier,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
}))
}
// Persist and inject the dynamic redirect_uri so the IdP
// sends the user back to the same domain they started on,
// and so the token exchange below uses the matching value.
if dynamicRedirectURI != "" {
http.SetCookie(rw, cookieCfg.Apply(&http.Cookie{
Name: codersdk.OAuth2RedirectURICookie,
Value: dynamicRedirectURI,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
}))
authOpts = append(authOpts, oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("redirect_uri", dynamicRedirectURI))
}
http.Redirect(rw, r, config.AuthCodeURL(state, authOpts...), http.StatusTemporaryRedirect)
return
}
if state == "" {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "State must be provided.",
})
return
}
stateCookie, err := r.Cookie(codersdk.OAuth2StateCookie)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusUnauthorized, codersdk.Response{
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Cookie %q must be provided.", codersdk.OAuth2StateCookie),
})
return
}
if stateCookie.Value != state {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusUnauthorized, codersdk.Response{
Message: "State mismatched.",
})
return
}
stateRedirect, err := r.Cookie(codersdk.OAuth2RedirectCookie)
if err == nil {
redirect = stateRedirect.Value
}
exchangeOpts := make([]oauth2.AuthCodeOption, 0)
if sha256PKCESupported {
pkceVerifier, err := r.Cookie(codersdk.OAuth2PKCEVerifier)
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "PKCE challenge must be provided.",
})
return
}
exchangeOpts = append(exchangeOpts, oauth2.VerifierOption(pkceVerifier.Value))
}
// RFC 6749 section 4.1.3: the redirect_uri included in the token
// exchange must match the one sent in the authorization request.
// When the dynamic-redirect path is in use, the original value was
// stashed in a cookie; replay it here.
//
// Defense in depth: we do not blindly forward the cookie value to
// the IdP. We recompute the expected redirect_uri from the (already
// allowlist-validated) request Host, then require the cookie to
// match. This guards against:
// - The cookie going missing (e.g. third-party cookie blocking)
// and silently falling back to the static redirect_uri, which
// would mismatch the authorization request and produce a
// confusing IdP rejection. Fail loudly here instead.
// - A tampered cookie pointing at a host the user did not
// authenticate on. The IdP allowlist would normally catch this,
// but we should not depend on it.
if dynamicRedirectEnabled {
redirectCookie, err := r.Cookie(codersdk.OAuth2RedirectURICookie)
if err != nil || redirectCookie.Value == "" {
if rlogger := loggermw.RequestLoggerFromContext(ctx); rlogger != nil {
rlogger.WithFields(slog.F("oidc_rejected_reason", "missing_redirect_uri_cookie"))
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: fmt.Sprintf("Cookie %q must be provided for the OIDC callback when CODER_OIDC_REDIRECT_ALLOWED_HOSTS is configured.", codersdk.OAuth2RedirectURICookie),
})
return
}
expectedRedirectURI := buildDynamicRedirectURI(r, redirectDefaultScheme)
if redirectCookie.Value != expectedRedirectURI {
if rlogger := loggermw.RequestLoggerFromContext(ctx); rlogger != nil {
rlogger.WithFields(
slog.F("oidc_rejected_reason", "redirect_uri_cookie_mismatch"),
slog.F("oidc_cookie_redirect_uri", redirectCookie.Value),
slog.F("oidc_expected_redirect_uri", expectedRedirectURI),
)
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "OIDC redirect_uri cookie does not match the current request host.",
})
return
}
exchangeOpts = append(exchangeOpts, oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("redirect_uri", redirectCookie.Value))
}
oauthToken, err := config.Exchange(ctx, code, exchangeOpts...)
if err != nil {
errorCode := http.StatusInternalServerError
detail := err.Error()
if detail == "authorization_pending" {
// In the device flow, the token may not be immediately
// available. This is expected, and the client will retry.
errorCode = http.StatusBadRequest
}
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, errorCode, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Failed exchanging Oauth code.",
Detail: detail,
})
return
}
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2StateKey{}, OAuth2State{
Token: oauthToken,
Redirect: redirect,
StateString: state,
})
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
type (
oauth2ProviderAppParamContextKey struct{}
oauth2ProviderAppSecretParamContextKey struct{}
)
// OAuth2ProviderApp returns the OAuth2 app from the ExtractOAuth2ProviderAppParam handler.
func OAuth2ProviderApp(r *http.Request) database.OAuth2ProviderApp {
app, ok := r.Context().Value(oauth2ProviderAppParamContextKey{}).(database.OAuth2ProviderApp)
if !ok {
panic("developer error: oauth2 app param middleware not provided")
}
return app
}
// ExtractOAuth2ProviderApp grabs an OAuth2 app from the "app" URL parameter. This
// middleware requires the API key middleware higher in the call stack for
// authentication.
func ExtractOAuth2ProviderApp(db database.Store) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return extractOAuth2ProviderAppBase(db, &codersdkErrorWriter{})
}
// ExtractOAuth2ProviderAppWithOAuth2Errors is the same as ExtractOAuth2ProviderApp but
// returns OAuth2-compliant errors instead of generic API errors. This should be used
// for OAuth2 endpoints like /oauth2/tokens.
func ExtractOAuth2ProviderAppWithOAuth2Errors(db database.Store) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return extractOAuth2ProviderAppBase(db, &oauth2ErrorWriter{})
}
// errorWriter interface abstracts different error response formats.
// This uses the Strategy pattern to avoid a control flag (useOAuth2Errors bool)
// which was flagged by the linter as an anti-pattern. Instead of duplicating
// the entire function logic or using a boolean parameter, we inject the error
// handling behavior through this interface.
type errorWriter interface {
writeMissingClientID(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter)
writeInvalidClientID(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, err error)
writeClientNotFound(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter)
writeRequestTooLarge(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, limit int64)
}
// codersdkErrorWriter writes standard codersdk errors for general API endpoints
type codersdkErrorWriter struct{}
func (*codersdkErrorWriter) writeMissingClientID(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter) {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Missing OAuth2 client ID.",
})
}
func (*codersdkErrorWriter) writeInvalidClientID(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusUnauthorized, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Invalid OAuth2 client ID.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
}
func (*codersdkErrorWriter) writeClientNotFound(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter) {
// Management API endpoints return 404 for missing OAuth2 apps (proper REST semantics).
// This differs from OAuth2 protocol endpoints which return 401 "invalid_client" per RFC 6749.
// Returning 401 here would trigger the frontend's automatic logout interceptor when React Query
// refetches a deleted app, incorrectly logging out users who just deleted their own OAuth2 apps.
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusNotFound, codersdk.Response{
Message: "OAuth2 application not found.",
})
}
func (*codersdkErrorWriter) writeRequestTooLarge(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, limit int64) {
httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit(ctx, limit)
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Request body too large.",
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("Maximum request body size is %d bytes.", limit),
})
}
// oauth2ErrorWriter writes OAuth2-compliant errors for OAuth2 endpoints
type oauth2ErrorWriter struct{}
func (*oauth2ErrorWriter) writeMissingClientID(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter) {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeInvalidRequest, "Missing client_id parameter")
}
func (*oauth2ErrorWriter) writeInvalidClientID(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, _ error) {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusUnauthorized, codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeInvalidClient, "The client credentials are invalid")
}
func (*oauth2ErrorWriter) writeClientNotFound(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter) {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusUnauthorized, codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeInvalidClient, "The client credentials are invalid")
}
func (*oauth2ErrorWriter) writeRequestTooLarge(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, limit int64) {
httpapi.WriteOAuth2RequestTooLarge(ctx, rw, limit)
}
// extractOAuth2ProviderAppBase is the internal implementation that uses the strategy pattern
// instead of a control flag to handle different error formats.
func extractOAuth2ProviderAppBase(db database.Store, errWriter errorWriter) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
// This middleware mounts on /oauth2/authorize, /oauth2/tokens,
// /oauth2/revoke, and /api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/{app}, so the
// wrap covers all four. It belongs here rather than in the handlers
// because POST /oauth2/tokens and POST /oauth2/revoke authenticate
// the client from the request body, so they cannot require an API
// key and their body is read before any authorization decision.
// Bound it ahead of every reader: r.ParseForm below, and the
// handlers downstream, all read through this wrap.
//
// net/http caps an unwrapped urlencoded body at its own 10 MiB
// maxFormSize, which is 2.5x the ceiling every other endpoint
// carries. It defers to a *http.MaxBytesReader when it finds one,
// so installing one replaces that cap with this one.
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(rw, r.Body, httpapi.DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes)
// App can come from a URL param, query param, or form value.
paramID := "app"
var appID uuid.UUID
if chi.URLParam(r, paramID) != "" {
var ok bool
appID, ok = ParseUUIDParam(rw, r, "app")
if !ok {
return
}
} else {
// If not provided by the url, then it is provided according to the
// oauth 2 spec. This can occur with query params, or in the body as
// form parameters.
// This also depends on if you are doing a POST (tokens) or GET (authorize).
paramAppID := r.URL.Query().Get("client_id")
if paramAppID == "" {
// Check the form params!
err := r.ParseForm()
if maxBytesErr, ok := errors.AsType[*http.MaxBytesError](err); ok {
// An oversized body is a size failure and is reported as
// one. Falling through would report the client_id this
// body may well have carried as missing.
errWriter.writeRequestTooLarge(ctx, rw, maxBytesErr.Limit)
return
}
if err == nil {
paramAppID = r.Form.Get("client_id")
}
// Any other parse failure is not fatal here: the client_id
// may still arrive through HTTP Basic below.
}
if paramAppID == "" {
// RFC 6749 §2.3.1: confidential clients may authenticate via
// HTTP Basic where the username is the client_id.
if user, _, ok := r.BasicAuth(); ok && user != "" {
paramAppID = user
}
}
if paramAppID == "" {
errWriter.writeMissingClientID(ctx, rw)
return
}
var err error
appID, err = uuid.Parse(paramAppID)
if err != nil {
errWriter.writeInvalidClientID(ctx, rw, err)
return
}
}
app, err := db.GetOAuth2ProviderAppByID(ctx, appID)
if httpapi.Is404Error(err) {
errWriter.writeClientNotFound(ctx, rw)
return
}
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Internal error fetching OAuth2 app.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2ProviderAppParamContextKey{}, app)
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
// OAuth2ProviderAppSecret returns the OAuth2 app secret from the
// ExtractOAuth2ProviderAppSecretParam handler.
func OAuth2ProviderAppSecret(r *http.Request) database.OAuth2ProviderAppSecret {
app, ok := r.Context().Value(oauth2ProviderAppSecretParamContextKey{}).(database.OAuth2ProviderAppSecret)
if !ok {
panic("developer error: oauth2 app secret param middleware not provided")
}
return app
}
// ExtractOAuth2ProviderAppSecret grabs an OAuth2 app secret from the "app" and
// "secret" URL parameters. This middleware requires the ExtractOAuth2ProviderApp
// middleware higher in the stack
func ExtractOAuth2ProviderAppSecret(db database.Store) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := r.Context()
secretID, ok := ParseUUIDParam(rw, r, "secretID")
if !ok {
return
}
app := OAuth2ProviderApp(r)
secret, err := db.GetOAuth2ProviderAppSecretByID(ctx, secretID)
if httpapi.Is404Error(err) {
httpapi.ResourceNotFound(rw)
return
}
if err != nil {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Internal error fetching OAuth2 app secret.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return
}
// If the user can read the secret they can probably also read the app it
// belongs to and they can read this app as well, so it seems safe to give
// them a more helpful message than a 404 on mismatches.
if app.ID != secret.AppID {
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "App ID does not match secret app ID.",
})
return
}
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, oauth2ProviderAppSecretParamContextKey{}, secret)
next.ServeHTTP(rw, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
// buildDynamicRedirectURI constructs the OIDC redirect_uri from the incoming
// request, used when CODER_OIDC_REDIRECT_ALLOWED_HOSTS is configured.
//
// The scheme is taken from the configured AccessURL (passed in as
// defaultScheme by the caller) rather than from the request itself. Real
// deployments that use this feature always sit behind a TLS-terminating
// proxy, and some such proxies set X-Forwarded-Proto to the inner-hop
// scheme (e.g. "http" between proxy and coderd) instead of the original
// client-facing scheme. Trusting the request for scheme would produce a
// redirect_uri the IdP rejects. AccessURL is the operator-defined source
// of truth and is the same value the static OIDC path uses, so reusing
// it keeps the dynamic and static paths byte-for-byte consistent.
//
// The callback path is whatever path the middleware is mounted at, which
// today is /api/v2/users/oidc/callback for OIDC.
func buildDynamicRedirectURI(r *http.Request, defaultScheme string) string {
u := url.URL{
Scheme: defaultScheme,
Host: r.Host,
Path: r.URL.Path,
}
return u.String()
}