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Copy pathrealip.go
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310 lines (273 loc) · 10 KB
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package httpmw
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/xerrors"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpapi"
)
const (
headerXForwardedFor string = "X-Forwarded-For"
headerXForwardedProto string = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
)
// RealIPConfig configures the search order for the function, which controls
// which headers to consider trusted.
type RealIPConfig struct {
// TrustedOrigins is a list of networks that will be trusted. If
// any non-trusted address supplies these headers, they will be
// ignored.
TrustedOrigins []*net.IPNet
// TrustedHeaders lists headers that are trusted for forwarding
// IP addresses. e.g. "CF-Connecting-IP", "True-Client-IP", etc.
TrustedHeaders []string
}
// ExtractRealIP is a middleware that uses headers from reverse proxies to
// propagate origin IP address information, when configured to do so.
func ExtractRealIP(config *RealIPConfig) func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
// Preserve the original TLS connection state and RemoteAddr
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), ctxKey{}, &RealIPState{
Config: config,
OriginalRemoteAddr: req.RemoteAddr,
}))
info, err := ExtractRealIPAddress(config, req)
if err != nil {
httpapi.InternalServerError(w, err)
return
}
req.RemoteAddr = info.String()
next.ServeHTTP(w, req)
})
}
}
// ExtractRealIPAddress returns the original client address according to the
// configuration and headers. It does not mutate the original request.
func ExtractRealIPAddress(config *RealIPConfig, req *http.Request) (net.IP, error) {
if config == nil {
config = &RealIPConfig{
TrustedOrigins: nil,
TrustedHeaders: nil,
}
}
cf := isContainedIn(config.TrustedOrigins, getRemoteAddress(req.RemoteAddr))
if !cf {
// Address is not valid or the origin is not trusted; use the
// original address
return getRemoteAddress(req.RemoteAddr), nil
}
for _, trustedHeader := range config.TrustedHeaders {
// X-Forwarded-For is a list-valued header. Per RFC 7230, multiple
// field lines with the same name are equivalent to a single
// comma-separated value. Join them so a client cannot hide a spoofed
// address in the first field line, which Header.Get would return on
// its own. Other forwarding headers carry a single edge-proxy value,
// so use Header.Get to preserve their first-value semantics.
value := req.Header.Get(trustedHeader)
if http.CanonicalHeaderKey(trustedHeader) == headerXForwardedFor {
value = strings.Join(req.Header.Values(trustedHeader), ",")
}
addr := extractForwardedAddress(config, value)
if addr != nil {
return addr, nil
}
}
return getRemoteAddress(req.RemoteAddr), nil
}
// FilterUntrustedOriginHeaders removes all known proxy headers from the
// request for untrusted origins, and ensures that only one copy
// of each proxy header is set.
func FilterUntrustedOriginHeaders(config *RealIPConfig, req *http.Request) {
if config == nil {
config = &RealIPConfig{
TrustedOrigins: nil,
TrustedHeaders: nil,
}
}
cf := isContainedIn(config.TrustedOrigins, getRemoteAddress(req.RemoteAddr))
if !cf {
// Address is not valid or the origin is not trusted; clear
// all known proxy headers and return
for _, header := range config.TrustedHeaders {
req.Header.Del(header)
}
return
}
for _, header := range config.TrustedHeaders {
// X-Forwarded-For is a list-valued header whose field lines are
// equivalent to a single comma-separated value (RFC 7230 section
// 3.2.2). Join them so later hops are not dropped when collapsing to a
// single line. Other forwarding headers carry a single value.
if http.CanonicalHeaderKey(header) == headerXForwardedFor {
req.Header.Set(header, strings.Join(req.Header.Values(header), ","))
continue
}
req.Header.Set(header, req.Header.Get(header))
}
}
// EffectiveHost returns the host Coder should trust for request handling.
// It uses X-Forwarded-Host only when the immediate peer is a configured
// trusted proxy. Otherwise it uses the received Host header.
func EffectiveHost(config *RealIPConfig, r *http.Request) string {
if config == nil {
config = &RealIPConfig{
TrustedOrigins: nil,
TrustedHeaders: nil,
}
}
// When ExtractRealIP has run, r.RemoteAddr may hold the forwarded
// client IP, and we should use the original socket peer for proxy
// trust decisions.
remoteAddr := r.RemoteAddr
state := RealIP(r.Context())
if state != nil && state.OriginalRemoteAddr != "" {
remoteAddr = state.OriginalRemoteAddr
}
if isContainedIn(config.TrustedOrigins, getRemoteAddress(remoteAddr)) {
if host := r.Header.Get(httpapi.XForwardedHostHeader); host != "" {
return host
}
}
return r.Host
}
// EnsureXForwardedForHeader ensures that the request has an X-Forwarded-For
// header. It uses the following logic:
//
// 1. If we have a direct connection (remoteAddr == proxyAddr), then
// set it to remoteAddr
// 2. If we have a proxied connection (remoteAddr != proxyAddr) and
// X-Forwarded-For doesn't begin with remoteAddr, then overwrite
// it with remoteAddr,proxyAddr
// 3. If we have a proxied connection (remoteAddr != proxyAddr) and
// X-Forwarded-For begins with remoteAddr, then append proxyAddr
// to the original X-Forwarded-For header
// 4. If X-Forwarded-Proto is not set, then it will be set to "https"
// if req.TLS != nil, otherwise it will be set to "http"
func EnsureXForwardedForHeader(req *http.Request) error {
state := RealIP(req.Context())
if state == nil {
return xerrors.New("request does not contain realip.State; was it processed by httpmw.ExtractRealIP?")
}
remoteAddr := getRemoteAddress(req.RemoteAddr)
if remoteAddr == nil {
return xerrors.Errorf("failed to parse remote address: %s", remoteAddr)
}
proxyAddr := getRemoteAddress(state.OriginalRemoteAddr)
if proxyAddr == nil {
return xerrors.Errorf("failed to parse original address: %s", proxyAddr)
}
if remoteAddr.Equal(proxyAddr) {
req.Header.Set(headerXForwardedFor, remoteAddr.String())
} else {
forwarded := req.Header.Get(headerXForwardedFor)
if forwarded == "" || !remoteAddr.Equal(getRemoteAddress(forwarded)) {
req.Header.Set(headerXForwardedFor, remoteAddr.String()+","+proxyAddr.String())
} else {
req.Header.Set(headerXForwardedFor, forwarded+","+proxyAddr.String())
}
}
if req.Header.Get(headerXForwardedProto) == "" {
if req.TLS != nil {
req.Header.Set(headerXForwardedProto, "https")
} else {
req.Header.Set(headerXForwardedProto, "http")
}
}
return nil
}
// getRemoteAddress extracts a single IP address from the given string,
// stripping a port if present. If the string contains commas, only the
// portion before the first comma is parsed. This helper does not select the
// real client from a multi-hop X-Forwarded-For chain; use
// extractForwardedAddress for that, which accounts for client-supplied values.
func getRemoteAddress(address string) net.IP {
// A value may contain a port and, for a raw X-Forwarded-For value, more
// than one comma-separated address. Parse only the part before the first
// comma.
i := strings.IndexByte(address, ',')
if i == -1 {
i = len(address)
}
// If the address contains a port, remove it
firstAddress := address[:i]
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(firstAddress)
if err != nil {
// This will error if there is no port, so try to parse the address
return net.ParseIP(firstAddress)
}
return net.ParseIP(host)
}
// extractForwardedAddress parses a comma-separated forwarding header value and
// returns the rightmost address that is not a trusted origin. Reverse proxies
// append the peer that connected to them, so when every trusted proxy hop is
// listed in TrustedOrigins, the rightmost untrusted address is the real client;
// any values a client prepends to spoof its address sit to the left of the
// addresses inserted by trusted proxies and are ignored. If every parsed address
// is a trusted origin, the leftmost address is returned. It returns nil when no
// address can be parsed.
func extractForwardedAddress(config *RealIPConfig, value string) net.IP {
parts := strings.Split(value, ",")
var leftmost net.IP
for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
ip := getRemoteAddress(strings.TrimSpace(parts[i]))
if ip == nil {
continue
}
// Iterating right-to-left, so the last assignment is the leftmost
// valid address, used as the fallback when all hops are trusted.
leftmost = ip
if !isContainedIn(config.TrustedOrigins, ip) {
return ip
}
}
return leftmost
}
// isContainedIn checks that the given address is contained in the given
// network.
func isContainedIn(networks []*net.IPNet, address net.IP) bool {
for _, network := range networks {
if network.Contains(address) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// RealIPState is the original state prior to modification by this middleware,
// useful for getting information about the connecting client if needed.
type RealIPState struct {
// Config is the configuration applied in the middleware. Consider
// this read-only and do not modify.
Config *RealIPConfig
// OriginalRemoteAddr is the original RemoteAddr for the request.
OriginalRemoteAddr string
}
type ctxKey struct{}
// FromContext retrieves the state from the given context.Context.
func RealIP(ctx context.Context) *RealIPState {
state, ok := ctx.Value(ctxKey{}).(*RealIPState)
if !ok {
return nil
}
return state
}
// ParseRealIPConfig takes a raw string array of headers and origins
// to produce a config.
func ParseRealIPConfig(headers, origins []string) (*RealIPConfig, error) {
config := &RealIPConfig{
TrustedOrigins: []*net.IPNet{},
TrustedHeaders: []string{},
}
for _, origin := range origins {
_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(origin)
if err != nil {
return nil, xerrors.Errorf("parse proxy origin %q: %w", origin, err)
}
config.TrustedOrigins = append(config.TrustedOrigins, network)
}
for index, header := range headers {
headers[index] = http.CanonicalHeaderKey(header)
}
config.TrustedHeaders = headers
return config, nil
}