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37 changes: 22 additions & 15 deletions beyond-pg-init/src/env_relay.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
//! The database's password comes from the sealed env relay, never from MMDS.
//! The database's password comes from the sealed env relay, never from MMDS, and it arrives only as a SCRAM-SHA-256 verifier.
//!
//! The password is generated by the node's postgres driver (the platform-generated secrets of the Beyond repo), sealed to the tenant's node key
//! and stored by the API as a sealed variable: nothing central ever holds it. PID 1 asks for it over the substrate vsock it already owns, the way
//! every guest asks its driver for its env, and writes it into the metadata file the supervisor reads, before the supervisor starts. The
//! supervisor's `post_start` then runs `ALTER ROLE postgres PASSWORD` on EVERY start, so a data directory that carries another instance's role
//! hash (a fork, a restore) takes this instance's value.
//! and stored by the API as a sealed variable: nothing central ever holds it. The driver derives a verifier from it on the node (RFC 5802/7677,
//! `SCRAM-SHA-256$4096:<salt>$<StoredKey>:<ServerKey>`, a fresh salt each delivery) and hands the guest only that: this VM can check a login and
//! cannot present the password. PID 1 asks for it over the substrate vsock it already owns, the way every guest asks its driver for its env, and
//! writes it into the metadata file the supervisor reads, before the supervisor starts. initdb takes the verifier as the superuser's password
//! as it is, and the supervisor's `post_start` runs `ALTER ROLE postgres PASSWORD '<verifier>'` on EVERY start (PostgreSQL stores a verifier
//! as given), so a data directory that carries another instance's role hash (a fork, a restore) takes this instance's value. A value that is
//! not a verifier (a driver from before this) is never kept, written or used: the ask repeats and, past [`WAIT`], init exits.
//!
//! Wire (`rustlib/wire` `env.rs` and `rustlib/vsock-protocol` in the Beyond repo, mirrored here so this repo builds standalone and pinned by the
//! tests below): the ask is an `AppMessage` (0x20) whose bytes are `[0xE1]`; the answer is an `AppMessage` whose bytes are `[0xE2][msgpack
Expand All @@ -31,6 +34,8 @@ pub const ASK_EVERY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(1);
pub const WAIT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);
/// The one variable the supervisor needs from the relay.
pub const PASSWORD_KEY: &str = "POSTGRES_PASSWORD";
/// What a SCRAM-SHA-256 verifier starts with (PostgreSQL's `rolpassword` form).
pub const VERIFIER_PREFIX: &str = "SCRAM-SHA-256$";

#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct AppMessage {
Expand All @@ -48,7 +53,7 @@ struct EnvPayload {
/// What the wait ended with.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Outcome {
/// The relay answered with a password.
/// The relay answered with the password's verifier.
Password(String),
/// There is no substrate (no AF_VSOCK): the metadata file is used as it is.
NoSubstrate,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -95,8 +100,8 @@ pub fn ask_frame() -> Vec<u8> {
frame
}

/// An inbound `AppMessage` payload (the msgpack after the type byte). If it is an env answer holding the password, keep it and wake the
/// waiter. Anything else (another primitive message, a malformed or empty answer) is ignored: the ask repeats.
/// An inbound `AppMessage` payload (the msgpack after the type byte). If it is an env answer holding the password's verifier, keep it and wake
/// the waiter; a password that is not a verifier is dropped here, so no plaintext is ever held. Anything else (another primitive message, a malformed or empty answer) is ignored: the ask repeats.
pub fn offer(app_payload: &[u8]) {
let Ok(msg) = rmp_serde::from_slice::<AppMessage>(app_payload) else {
return;
Expand All @@ -110,7 +115,7 @@ pub fn offer(app_payload: &[u8]) {
let Ok(env) = rmp_serde::from_slice::<EnvPayload>(rest) else {
return;
};
if let Some(pw) = env.vars.get(PASSWORD_KEY).filter(|p| !p.is_empty()) {
if let Some(pw) = env.vars.get(PASSWORD_KEY).filter(|p| p.starts_with(VERIFIER_PREFIX)) {
state().password = Some(pw.clone());
CV.notify_all();
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -204,15 +209,17 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap();
offer(&foreign);
foreign.clear();
// A plaintext password (a driver from before verifiers) is never kept: the wait times out and init exits.
offer(&answer(&[(PASSWORD_KEY, "s3cret")]));
assert!(needs_password());
assert_eq!(wait(Duration::from_millis(20)), Outcome::TimedOut);
let t = std::thread::spawn(|| {
let verifier = format!("{VERIFIER_PREFIX}4096:c2FsdA==$a:b");
let v2 = verifier.clone();
let t = std::thread::spawn(move || {
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(30));
offer(&answer(&[(PASSWORD_KEY, "s3cret")]));
offer(&answer(&[(PASSWORD_KEY, &v2)]));
});
assert_eq!(
wait(Duration::from_secs(5)),
Outcome::Password("s3cret".into())
);
assert_eq!(wait(Duration::from_secs(5)), Outcome::Password(verifier));
t.join().unwrap();
assert!(!needs_password());
*state() = State::default();
Expand Down
58 changes: 58 additions & 0 deletions tests/supervisor.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -669,6 +669,64 @@ fn supervisor_lifecycle_primary() {
);
}

/// The VM is handed only a SCRAM-SHA-256 verifier of the superuser's password (the Beyond node derives it; see `env_relay`). initdb takes it
/// as given and `ALTER ROLE postgres PASSWORD` on every start sets it again; a client that knows the ORIGINAL password logs in over SCRAM, a wrong
/// one does not, and the container holds no copy of the original in its metadata or environment.
#[test]
#[ignore = "requires Docker + musl target + beyond-pg-test:latest image"]
fn supervisor_with_only_a_verifier_accepts_the_original_password_over_scram() {
// PostgreSQL 17's own `rolpassword` for the password below (docker postgres:17, `SET password_encryption='scram-sha-256'`).
const PASSWORD: &str = "correct horse battery";
const VERIFIER: &str = "SCRAM-SHA-256$4096:cbHdwWtOk0dwNZAaQVTR9g==$NYFMnqzwzMV7CTFaCfBP5J3y41xmTmDJPDLE96pN3/o=:P8VydXaJRrINE2cDxQRh2CZobwRK3EbticDXin423Nc=";
let _guard = DOCKER.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
let harness = SupervisorHarness::new().expect("Docker, the musl target and beyond-pg-test:latest are required");
let container = harness.start(&[("POSTGRES_PASSWORD", VERIFIER)]);
if !container.wait_postgres_ready(Duration::from_secs(90)) {
eprintln!("logs:\n{}", container.logs());
panic!("Postgres never became ready");
}
assert!(container.wait_post_start_done(Duration::from_secs(30)), "post-start did not complete\n{}", container.logs());

let login = |password: &str| {
container.exec(&[
"env",
&format!("PGPASSWORD={password}"),
"psql",
"-h",
"127.0.0.1",
"-p",
"5433",
"-U",
"postgres",
"-d",
"postgres",
"-tAc",
"SELECT 'scram-login-ok'",
])
};
let ok = login(PASSWORD);
assert!(
ok.status.success() && String::from_utf8_lossy(&ok.stdout).trim() == "scram-login-ok",
"the original password did not log in: {}\n{}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&ok.stderr),
container.logs()
);
assert!(!login("not the password").status.success(), "a wrong password logged in");

// The server stores exactly the verifier it was handed, and the original is nowhere in the container's metadata or environment.
let stored = container.exec(&[
"gosu", "postgres", "psql", "-h", "/var/run/postgresql", "-p", "5433", "-tAc",
"SELECT rolpassword FROM pg_authid WHERE rolname='postgres'",
]);
assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&stored.stdout).trim(), VERIFIER);
let leak = container.exec(&[
"sh", "-c",
&format!("grep -rqF '{PASSWORD}' /run/mmds /proc/1/environ /proc/self/environ 2>/dev/null; echo $?"),
]);
assert_eq!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&leak.stdout).trim(), "1", "the original password is in the container's metadata or environment");
let _ = container.stop(Duration::from_secs(30));
}

/// Warm-start: a busy box that cold-restarts must come back at its pre-restart
/// pooler size, not a single worker — the post-restart reconnect storm is peak
/// handshake churn, the worst moment to be under-provisioned. children.json is
Expand Down
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