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[WIP] Ceph improvements - #147
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LibvirtStorageAdaptor#deletePhysicalDisk manually connected to Ceph via librados/librbd to unprotect and remove every snapshot of an RBD image before asking libvirt to delete the volume. libvirt's RBD storage backend has supported VIR_STORAGE_VOL_DELETE_WITH_SNAPSHOTS since 1.2.20, which does the same unprotect/remove internally. Pass that flag instead and drop the manual cleanup.
…pache#13835) * kvm: fix RBD exclusive-lock leak that breaks revertSnapshot on Ceph takeRbdVolumeSnapshotOfStoppedVm() called image.snapCreate(snapshotName) twice. The first call creates the RBD snapshot, the second one always throws RbdException ("Failed to create snapshot <uuid>") because the snapshot already exists. The duplicate is a merge artifact: 30d3066 ("Merge branch '4.20' into 4.22") resolved a conflict by keeping the call from both sides - each parent had exactly one. Because there was no finally block, that exception skipped rbd.close(image) and r.ioCtxDestroy(io), so the agent kept the image open and held its RBD exclusive-lock indefinitely. The exception is only logged, so the snapshot job still reported success and the fault stayed invisible. Consequences observed on a KVM + Ceph/RBD cluster: - revertSnapshot fails with "com.ceph.rbd.RbdException: Failed to rollback snapshot <uuid>". librbd returns EROFS because a live peer holds the exclusive-lock; 'rbd snap rollback' only succeeds once that client dies and librbd can break the lock, which makes the failure look intermittent. - getRbdSnapshotSize() is never reached, so every snapshot is reported with physical size 0 when snapshot.backup.to.secondary is false. - The leaked watchers keep the image busy, so 'rbd rm' fails and the volume cannot be expunged - it stays stuck in state Destroy. Note the method also runs for RUNNING VMs: createSnapshot() branches on "RUNNING && !primaryPool.isExternalSnapshot()", and RBD is an external-snapshot pool, so every RBD volume snapshot took this path. Remove the duplicated call and move the image/IO-context cleanup into a finally block so the lock is released even if the snapshot itself fails. * kvm: release RBD handles on every path when cloning a volume from a snapshot createRBDvolumeFromRBDSnapshot() closed the source image, the cloned image and the RADOS IO context only on the success path, and called snapUnprotect() only there too. Two paths escaped that cleanup: - the early "Could not find snapshot ... on RBD" return, and - any RadosException/RbdException from clone(), resize() or flatten(), which is caught and turned into a null disk. Both leave the images open, so this client keeps the RBD exclusive-lock. That later makes 'rbd snap rollback' (revertSnapshot) fail with EROFS from another host, and keeps the image busy so 'rbd rm' cannot remove it - the volume then stays stuck in state Destroy. The failure paths after snapProtect() are worse: the snapshot stays protected, and a protected snapshot can be deleted neither on its own nor together with its volume. Move the cleanup into a finally block, tracking whether the snapshot was actually protected so it is unprotected exactly when it needs to be. Failures during cleanup are logged and never mask the original outcome; a failed snapUnprotect is logged at ERROR since it needs manual intervention. This is the same class of defect as the leak fixed in takeRbdVolumeSnapshotOfStoppedVm(); no behaviour changes on the success path. * kvm: add regression tests for the RBD snapshot handle leak Two tests around takeRbdVolumeSnapshotOfStoppedVm, using the MockedConstruction pattern already used in this test class (the Rbd instance is created inside the method under test, so it cannot be injected): - createsSnapshotExactlyOnce guards the duplicated snapCreate call from coming back, and checks the image and IO context are released. - releasesHandlesWhenSnapshotFails makes snapCreate throw and asserts the image is still closed and the IO context destroyed, so a future failure cannot leak the RBD exclusive-lock again. takeRbdVolumeSnapshotOfStoppedVm, radosConnect and getRbdSnapshotSize widened from private to protected so the test can stub the Ceph interactions. * kvm: extract RBD handle teardown into null-safe helper methods Address review feedback: the nested try-catch teardown blocks in the finally clauses of takeRbdVolumeSnapshotOfStoppedVm and createRBDvolumeFromRBDSnapshot are extracted into two reusable, null-safe helpers that log but never throw: - closeRbdImage (3 call sites) - destroyRadosIoCtx (2 call sites) No behavior change. * kvm: extract RBD snapshot unprotect into a helper method Follow-up to the teardown helpers: the snapUnprotect block in the finally clause of createRBDvolumeFromRBDSnapshot moves into a never-throwing unprotectRbdSnapshot helper, so the finally clause is now free of inline try-catch constructions entirely. No behavior change. --------- Co-authored-by: calvix <7136358+calvix@users.noreply.github.com>
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-60)
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-61)
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@blueorangutan package |
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@weizhouapache a [SL] Jenkins job has been kicked to build packages. I'll keep you posted as I make progress. |
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-67)
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@blueorangutan package |
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the test failures (see below) with hostha have been fixed by kvm: support Host HA on Ceph RBD primary storage 
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Packaging result [SF]: ✔️ el8 ✔️ el9 ✔️ el10 ✔️ debian ✔️ suse15. SL-JID 19427 |
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-71)
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Packaging result [SF]: ✔️ el8 ✔️ el9 ✔️ el10 ✔️ debian ✔️ suse15. SL-JID 19454 |
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-78)
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Packaging result [SF]: ✔️ el8 ✔️ el9 ✔️ el10 ✔️ debian ✔️ suse15. SL-JID 19486 |
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Packaging result [SF]: ✔️ el8 ✔️ el9 ✔️ el10 ✔️ debian ✔️ suse15. SL-JID 19497 |
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-88)
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-89)
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Restoring a volume from a backup and attaching it to a VM has been broken since the restore commands were changed to run without a shell, in three independent ways. getDeviceToAttachDisk pipes virsh domblklist through awk, but passes the awk program still wrapped in the single quotes a shell would have stripped. Run directly, awk fails with "invalid char" and returns nothing, so the device name is empty and charAt throws StringIndexOutOfBoundsException before any attach is attempted. This affects every storage type. The exit value was also never checked, and the output not trimmed, so even a working awk would leave the trailing line separator and increment that instead of the device letter. The RBD branch passes the literal string "<<EOF%sEOF" as a virsh argument. The placeholder is never substituted with the disk XML, and a here-document cannot work without a shell, so virsh is handed a bogus argument and fails. The XML is now written to a temporary file that virsh reads. The Linstor branch declares "--subdriver qcow2", inverting the previous behaviour where Linstor got a raw attach and every other pool got qcow2. A Linstor volume is a raw DRBD block device, so libvirt rejects it with "Image is not in qcow2 format". The condition is restored, along with the "--driver qemu" that was dropped.
…BD (apache#13991) Ceph Tentacle 20.2.4 removed the legacy `auth_supported` librados option. CloudStack builds RBD connection strings with `auth_supported=cephx`/`none`, so every RBD operation through the KVM agent fails with "failed to set RADOS option: auth_supported". Switch the RBD string builder to `auth_client_required`, the modern option used by the qemu rbd driver and accepted by current Ceph releases. Co-authored-by: Wei Zhou <weizhou@apache.org>
… on RBD (apache#13361) RBD erasure-coded pool support (apache#9808) added handling of the rbd_default_data_pool storage-pool detail to RBDStringBuilder (qemu-img path) and to createPhysicalDisk (blank volumes), but not to createDiskFromTemplateOnRBD. As a result, ROOT volumes created from a template via rados-java rbd.clone()/rbd.create() are created without a data pool: all of their data objects land in the (replicated) metadata pool instead of the erasure-coded data pool, defeating the point of EC and consuming ~3x raw space. Set rbd_default_data_pool on the Rados connection (before connect) in both the same-cluster clone/copy branch and the cross-cluster copy branch of createDiskFromTemplateOnRBD, using the destination pool's detail. librbd then honors it as the default data pool when the new image is created, so template-derived volumes get data_pool set, the same way blank volumes already do.
…storeBackupCommandWrapper (apache#14006) * kvm: detect mount failures and honour the configured timeouts on backup restore Script.executeCommand returns null when the command fails, it does not throw, so the try/catch around the mount and umount of the backup repository could never fire and the return value was discarded. A repository that fails to mount was therefore treated as mounted, and the restore carried on against an empty directory until it failed later with a misleading "backup file not found". A failed umount was ignored the same way, leaking the mount. Both now go through executeCommandForExitValue and check the exit value. The same refactor also dropped the timeouts. mountTimeout was still passed into mountBackupDirectory but never used, and the rsync of the volume lost the command timeout, so both fell back to the one hour default in Script instead of the configured values. An unresponsive repository could hold a restore up for an hour rather than failing after nas.backup.restore.mount.timeout seconds. * kvm: clean up after a failed mount and bound the unmount of a backup repository The directory created for the mount is removed by the caller in a finally block, but that block is only reached once the mount has succeeded, so a repository that cannot be mounted left an empty directory behind on every attempt. It is now removed before the failure is reported, best effort and logged if it cannot be. The unmount ran without a timeout and so fell back to the one hour default in Script. Unmounting a repository that has become unreachable blocks as easily as mounting one, and this runs in the cleanup path of a restore, so it is now bounded by the configured mount timeout like the mount itself.
* storage: enable RBD/Ceph volume encryption support (shared base) Flip StoragePoolType.RBD from EncryptionSupport.Unsupported to Hypervisor so the existing encryption control plane (allocator, endpoint selector, offerings) treats RBD pools as encryption-capable. The agent-side encrypted RBD create path is not implemented yet; it is delivered by two follow-up tracks (qemu-native engine='qemu' and ceph-native engine='librbd'). Until then, fail closed at the two RBD create chokepoints in LibvirtStorageAdaptor (createPhysicalDisk and createDiskFromTemplate) when a passphrase is present, so we never silently produce a plaintext volume that the control plane believes is encrypted. No change for existing unencrypted RBD volumes (guards only fire when a passphrase is set; supportsEncryption() only affects volumes that require encryption). * kvm: Ceph-native LUKS2 encryption for RBD volumes (engine='librbd') Implements encrypted RBD data and root disks using librbd's native LUKS2 encryption, decrypted at runtime by libvirt/qemu via <encryption engine='librbd'>. CloudStack manages the passphrase (existing model). - RbdEncryption: isolated helper wrapping `rbd encryption format luks2`, cephx via --id + keyfile (secret not on the command line), LUKS passphrase via KeyFile. Kept separate so the CLI can later be swapped for a JNA binding (rados-java has no rbd_encryption_format API). - LibvirtStorageAdaptor: create/clone the raw RBD image, then apply `rbd encryption format luks2`; mark the disk LUKS2 so encrypt_format propagates to the volume. Replaces the fail-closed guards. - QemuObject.EncryptFormat: add LUKS2. - LibvirtVMDef: render <encryption format='luks2' engine='librbd'>; the encrypt details now carry an optional engine. - attach (KVMStorageProcessor) and boot (LibvirtComputingResource): set engine='librbd' for RBD-backed encrypted volumes. NOTE: the CoW-clone-then-format path (encrypted root from an unencrypted template) needs live-cluster validation for the parent-grow / usable-size behaviour described in the Ceph image-encryption docs. Builds: api + plugins/hypervisors/kvm (JDK11). * kvm: gate host encryption probe on librbd support for RBD hostSupportsVolumeEncryption() now advertises encryption capability if the host supports EITHER qemu-native LUKS (qemu-img LUKS + cryptsetup) OR librbd native encryption (rbd CLI with the encryption subcommand). Previously a Ceph-only host that lacked cryptsetup would not advertise encryption even though librbd can encrypt RBD volumes. Split into hostSupportsQemuNativeVolumeEncryption() and hostSupportsRbdVolumeEncryption(); kept HOST_VOLUME_ENCRYPTION as the single host-wide flag (documented limitation: not per-pool). * kvm: resize support for librbd-encrypted RBD volumes (#5) Encrypted RBD volumes are encrypted natively by librbd and must be resized with `rbd resize --encryption-passphrase-file` so librbd grows the encrypted payload and keeps the LUKS header consistent. The existing encrypted-resize path (resizeEncryptedQcowFile) uses qemu-img --object secret, which is for qemu-native LUKS and does not fit the librbd LUKS2 layout. - RbdEncryption.resize(): new `rbd resize` wrapper (cephx via --id + keyfile, passphrase via KeyFile, optional --allow-shrink). - LibvirtResizeVolumeCommandWrapper: detect encrypted RBD and route to the rbd resize path, bypassing the libvirt v.resize and qemu-img paths. Snapshot/revert, RBD<->RBD copy, and migration of encrypted RBD volumes need no code changes: they operate on the raw (LUKS-containing) image at the block level, and the destination passphrase secret is already created engine-agnostic in LibvirtPrepareForMigrationCommandWrapper. These still require live validation. Builds: plugins/hypervisors/kvm (JDK11). * kvm: route online resize of encrypted RBD through virsh blockresize For a running VM, an librbd-encrypted RBD volume must be resized in-band by qemu/librbd, not out-of-band by the rbd CLI. Gate the CLI rbd-resize path on !vmIsRunning so: - offline -> `rbd resize --encryption-passphrase-file` (librbd-aware), and - online -> existing NOTIFYONLY path -> virsh blockresize, where qemu's block_resize delegates to librbd to grow the encrypted payload and notify the guest in one step (no passphrase needed; qemu holds the secret). This avoids notify-less out-of-band growth and qemu/librbd size divergence while the image is open. Online behaviour still needs live validation that blockresize resizes the encrypted payload for engine='librbd' disks. * kvm: encrypted RBD root disks (thin CoW clone + full-copy fallback) Root disks could not be encrypted: cloning a plaintext template and then `rbd encryption format`ing the clone leaves the inherited OS data unreadable (the LUKS header offsets it), so the guest could not mount root. Fix, in createDiskFromTemplateOnRBD, with two paths: - Option A (same-cluster cached RBD template): grow the template base to reserve LUKS2 header space, snapshot+protect it (cloudstack-base-snap-luks), clone from it, apply the LUKS2 header, resize the clone to the requested size. Inherited template data stays readable through the clone's encryption and the clone is a thin CoW image (only the header is written). - Option B (first-use / non-RBD template): create an empty image, apply a LUKS2 header, then import the template THROUGH the encryption layer via RbdEncryption.importTemplate (qemu-img convert -n into encrypt.key-secret). Correct but a full copy. Validated end-to-end on Ubuntu 26.04 / libvirt 12.0.0: both boot; A is thin (3.5 GiB provisioned, ~120 MiB used); LUKS2 verified at rest on Ceph. * kvm: harden and align librbd-encrypted RBD volume code Review pass over the librbd LUKS2 encryption feature to fix latent issues and bring it in line with CloudStack conventions: - RbdEncryption: reject empty/null passphrase with a clear error; round rbd --size up to MiB so a non-aligned request never shrinks the volume below what was asked for; create the temporary cephx conf/keyring 0600 explicitly instead of relying on the umask. - LibvirtStorageAdaptor: close Rados/IoCTX/RbdImage in a finally block on the encrypted-root paths (mirrors deleteVolume) so handles are not leaked on exceptions; use parameterized log messages instead of string concatenation; extract the encrypted-root Option A/B logic into createEncryptedRootCoWClone / createEncryptedRootFullCopy. - RbdEncryption: use an instance logger (matching the plugin convention) and split argv construction into build{Format,Resize,Convert}Script so the generated commands can be unit-tested. * kvm: add RbdEncryption unit tests Assert the rbd/qemu-img argv built for format, resize and convert-through-encryption (RBD and file sources), and that empty/null passphrases are rejected. Command construction is verified without a live Ceph cluster. * kvm: refuse encrypted RBD hot-plug on libvirt < 10.1.0 libvirt 10.0.0 has an object apply-order bug (fixed in 10.1.0) that breaks hot-plug of an encrypted rbd blockdev: on attach the disk is opened before its LUKS secret object is defined, so the attach fails with "No secret with id '...-format-encryption-secret0'". Booting a VM from an encrypted RBD disk is unaffected (the QEMU command line resolves all -object before -blockdev). Refuse the attach up front with a clear error (mirroring the existing openvswitch/io_uring libvirt-version gates) instead of letting libvirt fail opaquely. Only the RBD hot-plug path is gated; boot/root/detach are untouched. * docs: add PendingReleaseNotes entry for librbd-encrypted RBD volumes * kvm: route the encrypted RBD template import through QemuImg RbdEncryption built its own 'qemu-img convert' command line, which duplicated qemu-img knowledge outside of QemuImg. QemuImg could only write to a plain filename destination, so importing a template through the librbd encryption layer was not expressible with it. QemuImg now supports a destination described by image options (--target-image-opts, with -n implied since such a target always exists already), exposed as convertIntoExistingTarget(). QemuImageOptions can render its parameters under either image-opts flag. RbdEncryption.importTemplate now composes QemuImageOptions and a QemuObject secret and delegates to QemuImg; its hand-built convert script is removed. The rbd CLI calls (encryption format, resize, support probe) stay, as qemu-img cannot perform them. No functional change to the generated command. * kvm: use readable variable names in the encrypted RBD root helpers Review feedback: single-letter and abbreviated names are hard to read. Renamed in the two methods added by this PR only (renaming the rest of the class is out of scope here): r -> radosConnection, io -> ioContext, rbd -> rbdClient, base -> templateImage, s -> snapshotInfo, encSnap -> luksReservedSnapshotName, haveEncSnap -> luksSnapshotExists, createSize -> imageSizeWithLuksHeader, srcIsRbd -> sourceIsRbdPool. No functional change. * server, kvm: report and require RBD volume encryption separately Review feedback: distinguish the two volume encryption mechanisms instead of advertising them under one host flag. host.volume.encryption goes back to meaning qemu-native LUKS only (qemu-img LUKS + cryptsetup), as it did before this PR, and hosts now additionally report host.volume.encryption.rbd for librbd encryption (rbd encryption format). The deployment planner requires the flag matching the pool type of each encrypted volume - librbd for volumes on RBD pools, qemu-native for any other pool type - at all three places it validated encryption support before. The pool is taken from the pools proposed alongside the host when present, so first deployments are matched accurately too; an encrypted volume with no pool yet accepts either mechanism and the storage pool allocator picks a pool the host can serve. This also stops a host whose librbd is too old for 'rbd encryption format' from being selected for encrypted RBD volumes; it previously advertised encryption through the qemu stack and the VM failed to start. --------- Co-authored-by: Václav Rozsypálek <vaclav.rozsypalek@master.cz> Co-authored-by: calvix <7136358+calvix@users.noreply.github.com>
findByID will fail for dummy template as it is stored in the deleted state.
…ion (apache#14162) * kvm: allow importVm importsource=shared from an RBD pool The CheckVolumeCommand wrapper on the KVM agent only accepted file based pools, so importing a root disk straight from Ceph failed on the agent with "Unsupported Storage Pool" and surfaced as "Disk not found or is invalid" on the management server. Add RBD to the supported pool types, take the virtual size from the disk libvirt resolved (qemu-img cannot open a bare RBD image name), skip the QCOW2 header check for raw RBD images, and build the rbd: URI when running qemu-img info, the same way LibvirtGetVolumesOnStorageCommandWrapper already does for listVolumesForImport. * kvm: record the real image format on an imported volume importVolume and updateImportedVolume both stamped the cluster default format for the hypervisor, so a volume imported from an RBD pool was recorded as QCOW2 while a natively deployed volume on the same pool is RAW. This affected both entry points: importVm importsource=shared for a root disk, and importVolume for a data disk. Pass the format the hypervisor reported for the existing image, from the check answer for a root disk and from the volume listed on the pool for a data disk, and fall back to the hypervisor default only when no format is reported. This also corrects a raw image imported from a file based pool. * vm import: plan the instance inside the pod and cluster of the requested pool importKVMInstanceFromDiskImage planned with the pod and cluster unset, so the planner was free to pick any host in the zone by capacity. When it picked a host in a cluster that cannot see the pool the caller named, the volume check ran against whichever pool that cluster does have, and the import failed with "Disk not found or is invalid" although the image was fine. Take the pod and cluster from the pool the caller passed, the same way importVolume already derives its host from the pool's scope * verify qemu is able to read the rbd image since check can not be done on a raw file * use computed volumeDetails in success path as well. * ui: do not call the imported disk a QCOW2 image The import wizard for local and shared storage described the disk as a QCOW2 image. An image on an RBD pool is raw, and a raw image on a file based pool can be imported as well, so the wording is wrong for both. Call it a disk image instead. Only the English strings are changed; the other locales come from Transifex.
apache#14188) getPhysicalDisk() asks libvirt for the volume. A volume that was just created by the management server is not in this host's libvirt pool cache, so the lookup misses and getVolume() falls back to refreshing the whole pool. Refreshing an RBD pool opens and stats every image in it, so the cost grows with the number of volumes in the pool and is paid on every VM start. On a pool holding 950 images that is 11.7 seconds added to each start, against 0.005 seconds to list the image names. Look RBD volumes up directly through librbd instead. Creating, cloning, resizing, copying and deleting RBD volumes in this class already use librbd directly; only the lookup went through libvirt. Because this runs on every VM start, the connection is handled more carefully than at the existing call sites: - the rados connection is shut down in a finally, so a client is not left for the finalizer. KVMStoragePoolManager.getPhysicalDisk retries a missing volume 100 times, so leaking here would mean 101 live librados clients for one absent volume. - the image is opened read only, since it is only stat'ed, and so cannot take the exclusive lock. - the image is closed through a helper that does not throw, so a failed close cannot discard a successful lookup or hide the original error. - the cephx key is only set when the pool has a user. librados aborts the process if it is handed a null value.
The monitors with a port, and the IPv6 monitors, are not valid arguments of rbd -m when the brackets are removed and the port is added to each monitor.
The field listed qcow2 and content but not rbd, the method this branch adds, so the one method a reader of this command is most likely to be chasing was the one the comment left out.
A restore rewinds the volume wholesale: the image is removed and rebuilt from its diff chain, so every snapshot it carried goes with it. The chain anchors this path takes are its own to drop, but a CloudStack volume snapshot kept on primary storage, or anything else taken outside this path, is content someone asked to keep, and destroying it quietly is not a trade the operator was offered. Ask what the image carries before touching it. A snapshot that is not one of ours refuses the restore, naming the ones in the way so they can be deleted or the backup restored into a new volume. Anything else is purged as before, except that an image which carries nothing is no longer handed a purge with nothing to do; when the listing itself fails we cannot tell, so it is purged as it always was. The failure to remove the image goes back to saying only that. Explaining it by a snapshot with clones made sense while a restore purged whatever it found, but the snapshot those clones belong to is now refused earlier, so a removal that still fails is failing for some other reason. The test that replays a whole chain stubbed every piped rbd call with the output of `rbd info`, whose "name" field would now read as a snapshot; tell the two commands apart there, and cover the refusal.
The key the script hands the rbd CLI lives in a temporary file for the length of a call. cleanup() removes it, but only the failure paths call cleanup, so an exit that does not reach it left the key behind. Leave its removal to the shell as well, which covers every exit it still gets to run code on.
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Packaging result [SF]: ✔️ el8 ✔️ el9 ✔️ el10 ✔️ debian ✔️ suse15. SL-JID 19558 |
composeOptionForMonHosts escapes every ':' of a monitor, because the colons separate the options of the rbd: string. That includes the colons of an IPv6 address, also when the pool has no port to add. Test that case, and make addPortToRbdMonitor, which is only used by RbdUtils itself, protected.
Lists the commits of the Ceph RBD work on this branch, from the smoke tests on Ceph up to the RbdUtils test, with the apache/cloudstack pull request each one belongs to, and the pull requests themselves.
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-103)
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…l pools Migrate a volume of a running Instance between an RBD pool and an NFS, SharedMountPoint or host-local pool, and between those file based pools, with a libvirt block copy on the host the Instance runs on, so that neither the Instance nor its host change. Migrate encrypted volumes between RBD and NFS, online and offline. Management server: - VolumeApiServiceImpl lets a KVM live migration through for these pool pairs, where it asked for migrateVirtualMachineWithVolumes before. A local pool has to be the one of the host the Instance runs on. - AncientDataMotionStrategy keeps the format of the volume right after the move: RAW on RBD, QCOW2 on a file based pool, and luks2 or luks as the encryption format, as the agent encrypts an RBD volume with librbd and any other volume with qemu. KVM agent: - LibvirtMigrateVolumeCommandWrapper builds the disk XML of the destination for the type of the destination pool, an RBD image or a qcow2 file, and copies the whole disk, so a volume cloned from a template does not depend on a backing file of the source pool. SHALLOW is only used from RBD to RBD. The source volume is removed after the pivot and the destination pool refreshed. - An encrypted volume gets its destination created with the encryption header first, and an offline copy goes through qemu-img with both secrets (LibvirtStorageAdaptor, KVMStorageProcessor). - LibvirtStorageVolumeXMLParser read the volume format with its arguments swapped and found none, so a migrated qcow2 file named like an RBD image was taken for a raw one and the Instance failed to start again. It reads the format of the volume now. - Every mon_host which LibvirtStorageAdaptor hands to RADOS is built by RbdUtils.getRbdMonitors, which gives each monitor its port, leaves alone one which has it, and brackets a bare IPv6 address. Tests: - Unit tests for the pool pairs which are accepted, the local pool of another host, and the dispatch of the agent to the block copy. - test_volume_migration_rbd_nfs.py migrates ROOT and DATA volumes online, offline and detached, encrypted or not, and stops and starts the Instance after every move to check that it is still reachable. - test_volumes.py: the data disk of the encrypted volume migration test is found by its size.
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Packaging result [SF]: ✔️ el8 ✔️ el9 ✔️ el10 ✔️ debian ✔️ suse15. SL-JID 19570 |
The objects KVMHA-hb-<host> and KVMHA-ac-<host> were named after the private IPv4 address of the host, as the heartbeat files on NFS. A host which gets a new IP address would lose its heartbeat, and the objects of a removed host could not be found from its GUID. On RBD pools the agent writes the heartbeat under the GUID of the host as the management server knows it (the guid of the agent and the name of the resource), and the checks of the neighbours use the GUID of the HostTO. The other pool types still use the private IP address, so that the heartbeat files do not change in a rolling upgrade.
The id of the heartbeat of a host is the GUID of the host on RBD pools, and its IP address on the other pools, so hostId could be mistaken for the id of the host.
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-115)
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…y storages A volume which is not live migrated is copied directly between two pools, with qemu-img and its passphrase, only if the data motion strategy can bypass secondary storage for both pools. A SharedMountPoint pool was left out of the pool types it bypasses it for, although it is a file based pool like the NetworkFilesystem and Filesystem ones: its volume was staged on secondary storage, and the copy to and from secondary storage does not handle an encrypted volume, so qemu-img failed with "Parameter 'encrypt.key-secret' is required for cipher" after the migration had been accepted. Bypass secondary storage for a SharedMountPoint pool as well, which the agent already supports: it copies a volume between two file based pools in place, and an encrypted one with its passphrase.
Once the block copy of a running Instance is pivoted, the Instance writes to the destination volume. migrateRBDVolume still let what follows fail the migration: the removal of the source volume in the finally block was not guarded, the refresh of the destination pool was inside the try, and so was the removal of the libvirt secret of the source volume in checkBlockJobStatus. A failure of one of them made the agent report a failed migration, so the management server kept the volume on the source pool while the Instance used the destination one, and the Instance would start from the source volume, or not start, the next time. For an encrypted volume the destination volume was even removed as that of a failed migration. Remember that the block copy was pivoted, and from then on only log the failure to remove the secret, to refresh the pool or to remove the source volume, and never remove the destination volume.
…sh out of the migration The volume format read by LibvirtStorageVolumeXMLParser changes how getPhysicalDisk picks the format of every volume of every libvirt pool, not only of a migrated one: libvirt probes the content of a file, so a tar template is reported as raw instead of tar, and a raw volume without a suffix is raw instead of the QCOW2 default. That is a change of its own, with its own testing, so go back to the parser it had. The migration does not need it. A volume migrated to a file based pool is named after the format of the destination, so the suffix of its name matches its content, and the refresh of the destination pool after the block copy is not needed either: getVolume refreshes the pool when it does not find a volume that was written outside of libvirt. Drop the refresh of the pool, and its test.
…a format copyVolumeFromPrimaryToPrimary named the destination volume <uuid>.<extension of the default format of the destination pool>: <uuid>.raw on an RBD pool and <uuid>.qcow2 on a file based one. The name of an RBD image is not read, but a volume keeps its name when it is migrated online to another pool, where the libvirt block copy writes a qcow2 file under it. A volume copied offline to an RBD pool, and then migrated online to a file based pool, ended up as a qcow2 file named <uuid>.raw. getPhysicalDisk takes a name ending with ".raw" for a raw volume, so the Instance could not be started again: qemu was told to open the file as a block device. Name the volume of an RBD pool after its UUID only. The volume of a file based pool is still named after its format, with the ".qcow2" extension.
…ools Revert the block copy between NFS, SharedMountPoint and host-local pools for now. A volume of a running Instance is copied in place only between two RBD pools, or between an RBD pool and a file based pool (NFS, SharedMountPoint or local), as both pools are then reachable from the host the Instance runs on. Storage answers which pools those are, so that neither caller compares the pool types itself: arePoolsSameType and isAnyPoolFileBased compare two pool types, areBothPoolsFileBased tells two file based pools apart from the rest, and isCopiedInPlaceOnKvm composes the combinations a libvirt block copy reaches. VolumeApiServiceImpl asks it in the live migration check and in the encrypted volume check, LibvirtMigrateVolumeCommandWrapper asks it to choose between a block copy and a copy with qemu-img, and AncientDataMotionStrategy uses the set of file based pool types it keeps. The tests of test_volume_migration_rbd_nfs.py which hop between two file based pools assert the refusal instead of the move: a volume attached to a running Instance is answered by the live migration check whatever the livemigrate flag says, and a detached encrypted volume by the encrypted volume check. An offline hop of a plain volume between two file based pools is still allowed, and is still made.
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Packaging result [SF]: ✔️ el8 ✔️ el9 ✔️ el10 ✔️ debian ✔️ suse15. SL-JID 19607 |
Extend the map to 1541e17 (59 commits) and map the commits of the volume migration work to their PR branch SHAs.
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[SF] Trillian test result (tid-119)
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…orage StorageVMSnapshotStrategy.canHandle() required either State.Allocated or a persisted vm_snapshot_details/STORAGE_SNAPSHOT row before it would claim a VM snapshot. A snapshot that fails before any underlying disk snapshot is taken (e.g. VM freeze fails because the QEMU guest agent is not connected) transitions to State.Error without ever persisting such a row, so canHandle() returned CANT_HANDLE and deletion fell back to DefaultVMSnapshotStrategy. That strategy sends a DeleteVMSnapshotCommand to the KVM agent, which requires a live libvirt domain - failing with 'Domain not found' once the VM is stopped, and blocking both snapshot deletion and VM destruction. Let StorageVMSnapshotStrategy also claim ownership of snapshots in State.Error even when no disk-snapshot details were persisted: there is nothing on the hypervisor to clean up in that case, and deleteVMSnapshot()/deleteDiskSnapshot() are already safe no-ops when the details list is empty - no libvirt domain is required. Fixes apache#13972
An RBD chain is exported from a snapshot of every volume, the anchor, named csbackup-<id>. Each backup drops the previous anchor once its delta has been exported, so one anchor per volume is kept: the one the next incremental reads from. Nothing removed the last one. When the last backup of a chain was deleted, or the Instance was taken out of its backup offering, the anchor stayed on the image for as long as the volume lived, and with it the data it references: the next backup is a full one either way, so nothing ever read it again. Remove the anchors of an Instance's volumes wherever the chain ends, next to where the Instance's active checkpoint is already cleared. nasbackup.sh takes a removeanchors operation, which sweeps every snapshot carrying the backup prefix off the volumes it is given: only the snapshots this tool creates carry it, so a user or volume snapshot is never touched. The removal is best effort. The chain is gone either way, and a host that cannot be reached must not fail the delete of a backup or the removal of an offering, so a failure is logged rather than thrown. An Instance with no volume on an RBD pool carries no anchor and is left alone.
decideChain carried a boolean telling the RBD flavour apart from the QCOW2 one, and every branch that differs between the two read it: the prefix of the anchor it names, the on-NAS format it requires of the parent, the decision it returns, and whether a stopped Instance can continue the chain at all. A third flavour would have to be threaded through each of them separately. Ask the flavour instead. anchorPrefixOf, flavorToFormat and flavorSupportsIncrementalWhileStopped answer the three questions the branches were asking, incrementalDecision builds the next link of a chain as fullDecision already built the first one, and both take the flavour. The prefix of a QCOW2 anchor is named alongside the RBD one rather than written in place. Behaviour is unchanged: a stopped Instance only reaches the full it took before when its flavour cannot continue a chain while stopped, which is every flavour but RBD, so the decision it returns is the same one. Also rename applyBackupFormat to applyBackupFormatToRestoreCommand, which says what it applies the format to.
Co-authored-by: calvix <7136358+calvix@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Wei Zhou <weizhou@apache.org>
Add the commits for apache#14456, apache#14386 and the cherry-pick of apache#13922, and turn the closing paragraphs into a list of notes.
The agent only needs the rbd command line tools for RBD backups and migrations; python3-rados and python3-rbd stay required.
- restore: check every target volume (RBD storage, no foreign snapshots) before removing any image, so a later volume cannot fail after an earlier one was already rewound - restore: replay each rbd import-diff with the restore timeout instead of the one hour default - backup: pause a running multi-disk VM around the RBD snapshots when the filesystems were not frozen, so the set is crash consistent - drop em-dashes from log and exception messages
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Packaging result [SF]: ✔️ el8 ✔️ el9 ✔️ el10 ✔️ debian ✔️ suse15. SL-JID 19692 |
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Description
This PR is used to test several ceph changes, which includes
Bug fixes
The commits of this branch are mapped to their apache/cloudstack pull requests in commit-pr-map.md.
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Feature/Enhancement Scale or Bug Severity
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